


**BETH ISRAEL DEACONESS  
MEDICAL CENTER**  
A member of CAREGROUP

**HARVARD  
MEDICAL  
SCHOOL**



# Getting That Just Culture – Speaking up safely and Fostering Acceptable Participation in Peer Learning

**Bettina Siewert, MD**

Associate Professor of Radiology

Vice Chair for Quality and Safety

# Learning Objectives

- Understanding the importance of error reporting and overcoming its barriers
- Creating a just culture
- Fostering participation in peer learning

# Introduction


Like high reliability industries, peer learning relies on error reporting to identify learning opportunities

- Aviation
- Nuclear Power plants
- Health care


... and requires

- error reporting systems
- culture of safety

Figure 1. U.S. Naval major aviation mishap rate (Naval Safety Center, 2007).



# Culture of Safety: Where are we in 2020?



<sup>1</sup>Wheale J. Irish Air Line Pilot's Assoc. 1983

<sup>2</sup>Ryan KD, Oestrich DK. Jossey-Bass 1991

<sup>3</sup>[www.silenttreatmentstudy.com](http://www.silenttreatmentstudy.com) (2005)

<sup>4</sup>Siewert B. Radiology 2018;283:693

# Cultural Barriers to Safety Event Reporting

**Table 1: Barriers to Speaking Up**

Barrier	All Respondents*	Those Who Always Spoke Up*	Those Who Did Not Always Speak Up*	<i>P</i> Value
High reporting threshold	149/290 (51.4)	35/124 (28.2)	113/163 (69.3)	<.0001
Challenging authority	151/315 (47.5)	37/124 (29.8)	112/167 (67.1)	<.0001
Lack of listening	121/292 (41.4)	33/123 (26.8)	88/169 (52.1)	<.0001
Fear of disrespect	106/292 (36.3)	18/124 (14.5)	88/167 (52.7)	<.0001
Witnessed disrespect	93/305 (30.5)	27/135 (20.0)	66/169 (39.1)	.0004
Fear of retribution	71/292 (24.3)	15/123 (12.2)	56/157 (35.7)	<.0001
Toxic captain	66/289 (22.8)	19/131 (14.5)	47/167 (28.1)	.005
Responsibility in the team	61/288 (21.2)	15/124 (12.1)	46/161 (28.6)	.0008
Shy personality	48/279 (17.2)	8/128 (6.3)	40/163 (24.5)	.0001
Lack of language training	57/268 (21.3)	9/123 (7.3)	48/163 (29.4)	<.0001

\* Numbers are raw data, with percentages in parentheses.


# Retribution: A Sign of a Punitive Culture of Safety

Fear of retribution most common reason for not speaking up in industry 70%<sup>1</sup>

- Retribution against the reporting staff and/or the staff involved in the incident

## Forms of retribution

- Losing one's job
- Disadvantages in work/vacation schedules
- Getting bad evaluations
- Not being considered for promotion
- Not getting good letters of recommendation
- Being labeled a complainer/"difficult person"



<sup>1</sup>KD Ryan, DK Oestreich. Driving fear out of the workplace

# Culture: What is it anyway?

## *Culture, definition:*

Set of shared **beliefs**, attitudes, values, goals and **practices** that characterizes an institution or organization

- held by organization's personnel
- “the way things are done around here”

# Types of Culture of Safety

Type of culture	Thinking about Errors		Practice
	Expected Frequency	Types and Frequency	Staff Responsibility
Punitive	None	Individual >>> System	Yes Yes
Just <sup>1</sup>	Few	System >> Individual	No Yes/No
“No blame” <sup>1,2</sup>	Many	System >>> Individual	No No

<sup>1</sup>Abudajeh HH. JACR 2015;12:4-5

<sup>2</sup><https://psnet.ahrq.gov/issue/just-culture-guide> 2018



# Principles of a Just Culture

## System Errors

- system issues are the most common cause of adverse events
- Focuses on identifying and addressing systems issues that lead individuals to engage in unsafe behaviors

## Individual Errors

- individual accountability is maintained
- distinguishes between types of human errors
  - unintentional human error
  - at-risk behavior
  - reckless behavior
  - malicious action
  - impaired judgement

# Just Culture: How to respond to different Types of Individual Errors

- ❖ HUMAN ERROR: an inadvertent slip or lapse. Human error is expected, systems should be designed to help people do the right thing and avoid doing the wrong thing.
- ❖ AT-RISK BEHAVIOR: consciously choosing an action without realizing the level of risk of an unintended outcome
- ❖ RECKLESS BEHAVIOR (NEGLIGENCE): Choosing an action with knowledge and conscious disregard of the risk of harm

# Just Culture and Leadership Accountability

Leadership is responsible for system errors  
- contributing to individual errors

## Substitution test:

Would another provider put in the same circumstances in the same systems make the same error?

## Human error

- System leaders are accountable

## Risky and reckless behavior


- System leader share accountability with individual staff

# Score – based Peer Review

## Cultural Implications

*Objective* evaluation of individual radiologist's performance

- Little consensus on scores
  - interobserver variability (Kappa 0.11<sup>1</sup>-0.23<sup>2</sup>)
- Systems issues not considered
- Focus on individual error
  - blames individual → isolation



Perceived as  
punitive culture

*Anonymous* case submissions

- Submitter easily knowable → damages relationships

<sup>1</sup>Bender LC. AJR 2012;199:1320

<sup>2</sup>Verma N. AJR 2016;207:1215

# Peer Learning Cultural Implications

Focus on performance improvement of the group


- Collaboration and teamwork create community
- “Feels inclusive and non-punitive” (Likert scores 4.76 and 4.64)

Supportive environment

- for individuals involved in adverse events

Living in a **Just Culture**

- Systems and individuals share accountability
- Increased error reporting



# Operationalizing Just Culture


## Starts with training

- Manager training in just culture algorithm (JCA)<sup>1</sup>

## Requires practice

- More consistent application of JCA
- More frequent use of “console” and “coach” responses
  - Enables institutional learning
- Fairer and more humane outcomes for employees while increasing patient safety

## Takes time

-  Slow awareness of Just Culture with frontline staff!
- ↑ in speaking up from 10-31% in 5 years<sup>2</sup>


<sup>1</sup>Broder J. AJR 2019;213:986

<sup>2</sup>Maxfield D. 2010 [www.silenttreatmentstudy.com](http://www.silenttreatmentstudy.com)

# One Institution: One Culture or Many “Micro-cultures”?

Perceptions of safety culture vary  
within institutions

- between ICUs
- between staff groups: physicians, nurses
  - mean score 43-75
  - percent positive score 9-69
- leaders have higher perception of culture of safety by 16%
  - aware of QI and safety efforts




# Challenges in Implementation of a Just Culture

## Transparency and Visibility

- feedback on RCA to reporting and involved staff
- communication of strong action plans to all staff
- participation of frontline staff in RCA with just culture algorithm

## Consistent Practice

- staff punished for system error or perception thereof  
undermines just culture efforts





# Summary of Shared Beliefs and Practices of a Just Culture

- The culture fosters performance improvement ✓
- Individuals are not responsible for systematic failures ✓
- Disregard for patient safety risks is not tolerated ✓
- Competent professionals sometimes make mistakes ✓
- Staff members report errors\* for continued learning of the community ✓

\*Including their own

# Further Considerations for Implementation of Peer Learning

Create a learning  
improvement community

Engaged leadership

Just Culture

- Consistency is key
  - everybody - always
- long process (3-5 years)
- Establish trust in the process

Peer Learning Systems

- Preserve anonymity of reporter
  - While collecting data on
    - No of submissions per staff
- Provide feedback after case review
  - To reporting staff
  - To staff involved in case
- Build learning opportunity repository
  - searchable

# Conclusion


## Getting that Just Culture

### Requires

- daily practice
- consistency
- transparency

### and enables

- ↑ error reporting
- ↑ organizational learning





# “Competent Professionals sometimes make Mistakes”

44,000-98,000 deaths annually related to medical errors<sup>1</sup>



How do we learn to accept and become more comfortable with our own vulnerability?

- Peer learning meetings
- Leaders/esteemed providers share their mistakes
- Feedback for individual providers
  - anonymous, electronic

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# Peer Learning Data base Submissions by Submitter

